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Abstract 
 
This article analyzes territorial disputes and political relationships at the border between China 
and Vietnam from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Predominant Western scholarship 
argues that, owing to the tributary relationship among states and polities, there was no territorial 
boundary in premodern Asia; furthermore, it suggests, the concept of the “geo-body” of a nation 
or sovereign state only arose with the transfer of new mapping technology from Europe. This 
article argues instead that the absence of lines of demarcation on Vietnamese and Chinese maps 
before the late nineteenth century does not connote a lack of consciousness of the existence of 
borders. The quest for autonomy throughout history by local communities living between China 
and Vietnam gave rise to border conflicts, which led to the intervention by and expansion of 
these two states, as well as negotiations and territorial division between them. The 
transformation of the China-Vietnam border from a premodern to a modern form thus did not 
depend solely on its cartographic representation; it also involved the power of the state to control 
space. Additionally, this article demonstrates that tensions over the border did not simply involve 
central governments but often resulted from a combination of local conflicts and the complicated 
relations between local actors and the state. The article suggests a new approach to exploring the 
history of state borders from the perspective of local people, in which the “in-between 
communities” are not seen as passive objects of border demarcation but are also a driving force 
in the establishment of a frontier. While the “in-between communities” discussed in this article 
were behind conflicts over land and its division into national territories, their manipulations of 
ethnic identity and transgressive mobility also helped blur the border between the two countries. 
 
Keywords: China-Vietnam border, territorial disputes, geo-body, state-making, local power, 
cartography 
 
Introduction 
In the fifth month of 1806, two tribal chieftains (thổ ty), Đèo Chính Ngọc and Đèo Quốc Uy, sent 
a memorial to the Vietnamese throne. These leaders—the magistrates, respectively, of Lai 
Mountain County (Lai châu) and Văn Bàn Mountain County (Văn Bàn châu) in Hưng Hoá 
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Commandery (Hưng Hoá trấn), which is now part of Lào Cai and Lai Châu Provinces—
explained to the emperor that, long ago, mountain settlements (động) in their own counties—and 
in Tung Lăng, Hoàng Nham, Tuy Phụ, and Hợp Phì Mountain Counties—had broken up, and 
that many of the inhabitants of those settlements had fled into Qing territory. The two chieftains 
suggested to Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820), who had founded the Nguyễn dynasty only four 
years earlier, that he should encourage these populations to return to the Vietnamese side; they 
could then resume paying taxes to the Nguyễn. After receiving an imperial edict to that effect, 
many tribal elders from the mountain settlements of Mường Tè, Mường Phù, Phương Mường, 
Tôn Na Y (in Lai County), Mường Ẵm (in Hoàng Nham County), and the mountain settlement 
of Bình Lư (in Tuy Phụ County) did indeed move back into Nguyễn territory.  
 
 
 
Map 1. Contested settlements, 1697–1806. 1. Ten Mountain Counties 十州; 2. Ngưu Dương 
Mountain Settlement 牛洋洞. Source: Hồng Đức bản đồ  [Hồng Đức map] (16??). 
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 The return of these tribal elders provoked a strong reaction from the Chinese; the Jiaqing 
court (1796–1820) claimed that the area covered by these six settlements (V. mường, Ch. muang) 
belonged to the Jianshui District (Jianshui xian) in Yunnan and had been included in Chinese 
maps since the Kangxi era (1661–1722). Their inhabitants had lived peacefully there for over a 
hundred years, so it was surprising that Hưng Hoá tribal elders were now trying to lure them 
back to the Vietnamese side. 1  From the Vietnamese perspective, the Jiaqing court was 
disingenuous in referencing the 1697 settlement as a point of departure, rather than as a 
milestone in a long history of conflicts between China and Vietnam over this particular stretch of 
border. That year, Vietnam sent a mission to China to pay tribute as usual; its main purpose, 
however, was to reclaim the three mountain settlements of Ngưu Dương, Hồ Điệp, and Phổ Viên 
in Tuyên Quang Commandery that had been seized by the Qing (see map 1).2 Not surprisingly, 
given the unequal power of the Qing and Lê-Trịnh3 courts, the mission ended in failure, with 
repercussions reaching into the nineteenth century.  
 The government of French Indochina and the Qing court eventually established a formal 
demarcation of the territorial limits of Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and China, with the Treaty of 
1887. As this article will show, however, a border already existed long before the advent of 
French colonialism. Furthermore, the Treaty of 1887 was not the final word on the matter. In 
1999, a treaty on land borders was signed by China and Vietnam, followed ten years later by a 
“final demarcation of their land border at the Youyiguan border gate in Pingxiang City in south 
China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.”4 The frontier area thus continued to be an object 
of contestation between China and Vietnam into the twenty-first century. 
 Scholars in both China and Vietnam tend to interpret border disputes as illustrations of 
the drive by the two empires to expand their control over the area in premodern times—an 
indication of their early push for territorial sovereignty (see Vũ D. N. 2011 and Ge 2014) and a 
reflection of their consciousness of their separate national identities. This is essentially an 
analysis of state-making that radiates from the center to the periphery. While relations of power 
and state perceptions have played an undeniably important role in territorial conflicts between 
China and Vietnam, so too have the actions of border populations and local officials. 
Additionally, and problematically, the center-focused analysis of the process of border formation 
owes much to modern Western cartographic practices. 
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Map 2. Map of Yunnan Province in the Qianlong reign, 1736. 1. Mengzi District 蒙自縣; 2. 
Duzhou River 賭咒河;  3. Kaihua Prefecture 開化府; 4. Border with Jiaozhi jie 交阯界
(Vietnam). Source: Yunnan Tongzhi (hereafter, YNTZ) ([1736] 1983, 13). 
  
 According to Western theorists, nationalism can only emerge when the inhabitants of a 
region share a perception of the space and territory they inhabit. This territory can be viewed like 
a living body, unified and indivisible, or as a “geo-body,” to use the term coined by historian 
Thongchai Winichakul. This perception is closely related to the current cartographic system that 
helps foster the concept of a national body with well-defined contours. The notion of a national 
geo-body, according to Thongchai, only emerged in Asia in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when Western-style cartography was introduced (see Thongchai 1994 and Anderson B. 
G. 2006).  
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 Traditional Vietnamese and Chinese cartographies included the borderland in their maps 
(see maps 1–4 and 8). The borderline was represented by symbolic objects, such as walls and 
border gates, or by vague lines that mostly reflected certain aspects of the landscape, rather than 
the territorial limits of the two states (Whitmore 1994). In the early eighteenth century, the Qing 
court commissioned European Jesuit missionaries to assist in making a survey of the empire, the 
result of which was recorded in a variety of maps. These maps, which adopted a coordinate 
system based on measurements of latitude and longitude, used dotted lines to represent the limits 
of Qing administrative units but made no distinction between provincial and international 
boundaries. Furthermore, the description of the Qing Empire in many of these maps also 
included information about the terrain beyond the southernmost provinces, which seems to 
express the continuous and significant influence of the Chinese indigenous cartographic tradition 
that emphasized the ideology of “Mandate of Heaven” by Chinese emperors until early modern 
times (Hostetler 2013). 
 Maps, however, are a necessary but insufficient condition for the emergence of national 
sovereignty (Branch 2014, 5). The inclusion of national borders in European maps does not in 
itself necessary denote a unified national body.5 Thus, while maps were a basic element in the 
emergence of sovereign nation-states, another important factor was the expansion and 
centralization of state power, which gave a different character to space (Branch 2014, 6). As a 
corollary, the absence of lines of demarcation on Vietnamese and Chinese maps before the late 
nineteenth century does not connote a lack of consciousness of the existence of borders. In this 
vein, the transformation of (neutral) space into (national) territory on the China-Vietnam border 
was not just a matter of cartographic representation; it also represented the state’s attempt to 
control space. Border conflicts between the two countries thus became means of acknowledging 
and enforcing the formation of their respective territorial boundaries before the advent of 
Western colonialism. In this process, both were aided at times and challenged at others by local 
people with their own interests and agendas. This article explores the process of border 
formation from the perspective of these local people, the “in-between communities” that lived in 
the China-Vietnam borderland. 
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Map 3. Left and Right River Commanderies and border passes in the Qianlong reign, 1736–
1795. Source: National Palace Museum, Qing Palace and Grand Council Archives, Ref. 038894. 
 
 The populations involved in nineteenth-century territorial disputes in Hưng Hóa 
Commandery belonged to a larger universe—the “Zomia,” a term coined by historian Willem 
van Schendel (2002) to refer collectively to the many communities living in the forest-covered 
massif that ranges from southern China to northern Southeast Asia. These communities were 
diverse ethnically (Zhuang/Tày, Nong/Nùng, Tai, Hmong, Yao) and linguistically (Mon-Khmer, 
Chinese-Tibetan), but they shared the characteristic of tribal organization and leadership. These 
groups were mobile across time and space, changing positions depending on the forging of 
alliances or the breakup, cooperation, or competition between non-state regimes (Scott 2009). 
Political scientist James C. Scott has argued that the Zomia was an alternative space that 
gradually split from the administrative system and culture of China. But, as this article will 
argue, the communities living in the Zomia along the China-Vietnam border had had close 
relations with their respective central governments over several centuries.  
 This article not only reconstructs diplomatic negotiations between Vietnam and China 
over disputed areas along their border, but also, more importantly, focuses on the complicated 
relations between their two courts and with the world of the tribal chieftains. It shows how “in-
between communities,” far from being passive objects of negotiations that resulted border 
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divisions, were in fact the causal agents of mutual suspicion and conflict between the two 
countries. Local disputes were often the primary instigators of state involvement in the control of 
populations and frequently led to the demarcation of territorial borders. The reaction of the 
Vietnamese and Chinese courts to local disturbances had the potential to solidify new territorial 
arrangements that were shaped by the power imbalance between them, by difficult natural 
conditions, and by reactions from local communities. In particular, the shifting allegiances of the 
local populations, as well as their kinship relations and trade networks, resulted in the fuzziness 
of these same borders.  
 
“In-Between Communities” and Border Administration 
  The dispute that pitted the Nguyễn and Qing courts against each other over border 
settlements in 1806 was neither the first nor the last such conflict in the history of Vietnam-
China relations. Rather, it was part of an ongoing process of territorial delimitation stretching 
back to the tenth century, the end of the period of Chinese occupation of what is now northern 
Vietnam. 
 For most of the first millennium of the Common Era, the mountain region between China 
and Vietnam seems to have been perceived by Chinese rulers as a relatively isolated space at the 
margin of imperial administrations (see, for example, Schafer 1967). From the period of disunity 
until the Sui (from the third to the seventh centuries), a collectivity called the Li-Lao became a 
significant force thanks to economic and political exchanges with Han Chinese and their control 
of channels of communication and trade between the Pearl and Red River Deltas. When the Tang 
came to power in the seventh century, the newly powerful state sought to destroy autonomous 
forces. Most of the area was divided into ji-mi counties—units of the imperial administrative 
system in which tribal chieftains were incorporated in the local bureaucracy and granted official 
titles (Churchman 2011). 
 The transformation of this area into a borderland only began in the early 1000s, when it 
suddenly became a buffer between Song China and Đại Việt, the new center of power that 
emerged in the Red River Delta after the fall of the Tang. The Đại Việt rulers, who had lived 
under Chinese cultural influence for centuries, built their state along the centralized Chinese 
model, while constantly seeking to extend their reach into adjacent space through military 
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campaigns and reclamation work. Early historical records document the many campaigns by Lý 
rulers (1010–1225) to extend the area under their control in the northern highlands.6 
 The unification of China by the Song after six decades of warfare and division opened up 
possibilities for reestablishing Chinese dominance in the south. But efforts at expansion and 
influence by military means met significant challenges from new regimes, including Đại Việt. 
After the defeat by the Vietnamese of its expeditionary force in 981, the attention of the Song 
court returned to this region after the 1052–1054 uprising of Nong Zhigao (Nùng Trí Cao), a 
local chief who, in a very short time, raised a rebellion and seized several prefectures (phủ) and 
districts (huyện), shaking up the entire administrative machinery of modern Guangxi and 
Guangdong (Anderson 2007).  To stabilize the southern region, the Song court aggressively 
increased security measures, built new administrative structures, and sent out appeals to local 
chieftains. These measures were, however, seen as threats by Đại Việt. The inevitable result was 
the outbreak of war in 1075–1077 (Hoàng 2004, 215–216).  
 Although the Song invasion of Đại Việt was a failure, the struggle between China and 
Đại Việt to gain dominance in the border area continued over the following years. However, 
these confrontations resulted in a stalemate, as neither side had the resources to control a 
peripheral area far from its center. The stalemate was resolved by the Treaty of 1084, the first 
official measure to divide up the space between the two empires.7 At the same time, a different 
political relationship was being maintained between the two—the tributary system—but this was 
mostly seen as a conduit for commercial exchange rather than diplomatic relations. It took many 
missions from Đại Việt over a whole century before the Southern Song recognized Lý Anh Tông 
as ruler of Annam (Annan guowang) in 1164.8 
 The establishment of a formal frontier had little impact on the ground because of the 
limited reach of the two states and especially because the whole border area was under the direct 
control of local chieftains. The Nong Zhigao uprising had shown the potential of local forces to 
threaten security along the border. Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to maintain order over the 
largest possible expanse of space and their competition for domination over the area became a 
race to win the hearts and minds of the tribal chieftains. Both sides made use of ji-mi, 
incorporating tribal chieftains into the local bureaucracy with official titles. The Lý and Trần 
dynasties (1010–1400) supplemented this policy by buying off chieftains and entering into 
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marriage alliances with them (Nguyễn and Nguyễn 2001, 235–255). Tribal chiefs were thus 
transformed into the front lines of defense along the border.  
 As James A. Anderson, a historian of the premodern Sino-Vietnamese borderland, has 
shown, Đại Việt’s close military and political connections with the mountain settlements spelled 
the difference in the outcomes of the confrontation between Đại Việt and the Mongols, on the 
one hand, and that between the kingdom of Dali (in modern Yunnan) and the Mongols, on the 
other, in the thirteenth century (Anderson 2014). The Mongols understood very well the 
importance of the communities located along the border; immediately upon coming to power, the 
Yuan dynasty officially recognized for the first time the status of tribal chieftains and brought a 
number of them into the administrative apparatus of the state. With the support of the chieftains, 
the Yuan were able to penetrate Yunnan and Guizhou, two areas that had previously not been 
part of the Chinese territory (Wen 2008, 37–41). 
 In the century after the late 1300s, both the rules governing diplomatic relations between 
China and Vietnam and the administration of the border area were elaborated and solidified. 
After coming to power in 1368, the Ming brought the tribal chieftains (Ch. tusi, V. thổ ty) into 
the formal bureaucratic apparatus to administer all the areas with non-Han populations. This 
policy was probably adopted in Jiaozhi (northern Vietnam) when it was under Ming occupation 
(1406–1426). In the early Lê era (1426–1527), the use of native (thổ) officials was widespread. 
According to the Records of the Heavenly South Composed at Leisure (Thiên Nam dư hạ tập), an 
administrative manual compiled in the fifteenth century, native officials were appointed in 
twenty-seven different locations with titles similar to the Ming tusi nomenclature.9 Relations 
between the Ming and the Vietnamese court were reestablished with more explicitly defined 
regulations and rituals, returning Vietnam to the Chinese tributary world order (Li Y. 2004). At 
the same time, Vietnamese elites, newly imbued with neo-Confucian ideas, began considering 
their country as a civilized nation on the same level as China (Kelley 2005, 28–36). Conversely, 
Chinese literati went from seeing Vietnam as a province within their empire to viewing it as a 
separate country of the “barbarian” (Ch. manyi, V. man di) universe, though still within the 
larger Chinese world order (Baldanza 2013). 
 The combination of the tusi/thổ ty system with that of tributary relations created a special 
context for maintaining order along the border and conducting diplomatic relations between the 
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two countries over a long period of time. Besides conferring legitimacy on the ruling dynasties of 
Vietnam, the tributary system also reduced tensions in the border area. From 1427, when 
independence was recovered from the Ming and the  Lê dynasty was established, to 1788, when 
a Qing expeditionary force escorted Emperor Lê Chiêu Thống back to Vietnam after he was 
overthrown by the Tây Sơn (1789–1802), there were localized conflicts, but no actual war, 
between China and Vietnam.  
 Expanding the role and increasing the power of the tribal chieftains helped the two states 
solve the problem of their limited ability to ensure security and administer the border area and 
also brought each more revenue and manpower (Wade 2014, 76–77). Nevertheless, this system 
also had unintended consequences. The appointment of tribal chieftains as representatives of the 
state helped them become autonomous forces in a number of areas beyond the state’s reach. For 
example, during the Ming, the Huang of Siming and the Cen of Tian in Guangxi became so 
powerful that they could not be ousted; instead, they were able to maintain their positions despite 
the fact that, on several occasions, they refused to obey orders and even defied the court (Shin 
2006, 78–81; Du 2011). On the Vietnamese side, tribal chieftains enjoyed even greater power 
and could even intervene in struggles at court; thus, the Mạc, expelled from the capital by the 
Restored Lê dynasty in 1592, were able to retain control of the border area for nearly a century 
thanks to the support of local tribal chieftains (Niu 2012). Additionally, although the tribute 
system was supposed to regulate diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam via regular 
missions, in many instances, especially daily cross-border exchanges, tribal chieftains used their 
status as representatives to intervene directly in relations between the two countries. 
 Until the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, tribal chieftains ruled over their 
own power bases in the border area despite occasional efforts by both the Chinese and 
Vietnamese courts to curb their secessionist tendencies through military campaigns. The 
principal means of dealing with their power, however, still consisted of courting them, as both 
sides needed the chieftains to manage the border. Beginning in the late sixteenth century, the 
Ming began to eliminate self-rule in a number of localities and to replace locally chosen leaders 
with appointed officials. However, the new policy eventually had to be abandoned; it proved 
difficult to implement due to strong opposition from the tribal leaders (Lan 2011, 299–358). On 
the Vietnamese side, the continued presence of Mạc forces until the late seventeenth century 
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prevented the Lê-Trịnh regime from seeking to expand its control toward the border area. This 
changed after the Qing withdrew support from the Mạc, who were then forced to abandon their 
stronghold in Cao Bằng and flee to China. With the Mạc out of the picture, the Lê-Trịnh regime 
became determined to eliminate the power and influence of local forces in the border region. As 
with the Ming and Qing courts, it encountered mixed success, owing to the ability of local people 
to escape the jurisdiction (and taxing and mobilizing powers) of both the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese courts by manipulating their ethnic identities, crossing the border, and switching 
allegiance at will.  
 
Dealing with an Expansionist State: Split Identity as Survival Strategy 
 The paucity of locally produced documents makes it impossible to construct a sustained 
or detailed history of a single border community; however, official histories and gazetteers, 
though composed from a state perspective, intermittently let us into the lives of these peripheral 
populations and afford us a glimpse into some of the strategies employed by tribal chieftains to 
increase their power and foster their secessionist aspirations. These strategies could also be 
viewed as measures aimed at avoiding the expansionist and oppressive policies of the state. In 
reality, as can be gleaned from various episodes recounted in official histories, tribal chieftains 
pursued extremely flexible courses of action based on their specific and immediate interests. This 
often entailed playing one country against the other, fleeing from one side of the border to the 
other in order to evade control or capture, switching allegiance, or even maintaining allegiance to 
both countries at the same time. Thus, the Zomia was not just a refuge from state power; its 
inhabitants frequently brought the state into the region. Three episodes involving the Vũ clan of 
Tuyên Quang and the Hoàng and Đèo clans in Hưng Hóa illustrate how local leaders played one 
state against the other by deploying flexible identities. Their maneuvers, however, not only 
brought the state(s) to the border area but also caused friction between the two courts. 
 The conflict that arose over three mountain settlements of the Tuyên Quang Commandary 
had its origins in the activities of the Vũ clan in the late seventeenth century. In the summer of 
1689, two decades after the defeat of the Mạc, a rebel force arose in Tuyên Quang; the Lê court 
dispatched an army that captured its leader, Vũ Công Tuấn. This was a significant moment in the 
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eventful history of the China-Vietnam border region because Vũ Công Tuấn headed a clan that 
had exercised great influence in Tuyên Quang for over a century.  
 The area in which the three disputed settlements were located had been under the control 
of the Vũ clan since the arrival in the mid-1500s of Vũ Văn Uyên, an official of the Lê (then in 
exile, while the Mạc were ensconced in the capital Thăng Long). Uyên had raised an army to 
fight the Mạc; at the same time, in order to consolidate his prestige, he also submitted to the 
Ming and accepted a position in the Chinese administration.10 Upon being restored to the throne 
in 1592, the Lê rewarded the Vũ clan for its services against the Mạc with the right to hold 
control of Tuyên Quang in perpetuity. But, beginning with Vũ Đức Cung a few years later, while 
clan leaders accepted titles in the Lê administration, they simultaneously began to exhibit anti-Lê 
and even secessionist tendencies. In 1659, Vũ Đức Cung’s son, Vũ Công Đức, even sent a letter 
to the Qing offering his allegiance.11 But only ten years later, after being courted by the Lê, Vũ 
Công Đức expressed his intention to travel to Thăng Long to submit. Vũ Công Tuấn was the last 
leader of the Vũ clan in Tuyên Quang to hold an appointment in the Vietnamese bureaucracy. In 
spite of his position, he crossed into Yunnan in 1685 and, with the support of Nùng (Zhuang) 
officials, raised troops of Nùng and Thổ (Tu) to conduct pillaging raids in Tuyên Quang and 
Hưng Hoá. Vũ Công Tuấn was finally captured four years later when he tried to return to Tuyên 
Quang.12  
 Residents of Ngưu Dương Settlement reacted to Vũ Công Tuấn’s defeat with an offer to 
submit. Nùng Đắc Tước, the head of the Hồ Điệp Settlement, also sent an envoy petitioning to 
return to the Vietnamese fold. The court ordered Tuyên Quang Commandery officials to write a 
conciliatory letter to him and to withdraw troops from Tam Kỳ (now part of Tuyên Quang City) 
to the capital.13 But this event led to conflicts between the Qing and Vietnamese regimes. The 
surrender of the heads of Ngưu Dương and Hồ Điệp Settlements led the Lê court to consider that 
“the three settlements of Ngưu Dương, Hồ Điệp, [and] Phổ Viên in Tuyên Quang had been 
forcibly annexed by native officials of the Qing bureaucracy of Yunnan.”14 In 1691 and 1697, 
the Vietnamese court sent two missions to the Qing capital in Yanjing to demand the return of 
these lands. This demand met with fierce opposition from Chinese officials. Shi Wensheng, the 
governor of Yunnan, explained that  
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the three settlements of Ngưu Dương, Hồ Điệp, and Phổ Viên have been part of 
the Chinese empire since the Ming. When the Qing opened up Yunnan, the 
settlements sent taxes to Mengzi District. In the fifth year of the Kangxi era, this 
was changed to Kaihua Prefecture. It has been so for more than thirty years. [The 
settlements] definitely do not belong to Vietnam and should not be returned.15   
 
The Lê court was forced to accept that, under the new name of Dongan County (Dongan li), the 
disputed settlements were incorporated into the Qing administrative system (Tang and Zhou  
[1758] 2004, 59–60) (see map 4). 
 
 
 
Map 4. Kaihua Prefecture in Yunnan Tongzhi, 1736. 1. The border of Mengzi District, Linan 
Prefecture 蒙自縣臨安府界; 2. Border of Jiaozhi 交趾界 (Vietnam); 3. Duzhou River 賭咒河; 4. 
Ngưu Dương Settlement 牛洋坪 (Vietnam). Source: YNTZ ([1736] 1983, 24). 
 
 During the chaotic Ming-Qing transition, many tribal chieftains under Chinese 
jurisdiction asked to become subjects of Đại Việt. In 1683, Cen Yinzun, the head of the 
mountain county of Guishun, and Zhao Guoqiao, the head of the mountain county of Sicheng in 
Guangxi, sent envoys bearing tribute of local commodities together with a laudatory message: 
“Wherever the royal army arrives, all come out to pay homage; the Mạc rebels have been 
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eliminated, the kingdom has returned to a single court.” The [Trinh] lord ordered that a reply be 
drafted and accompanied it with silver and silk and gave lavish presents to the envoy before 
sending him back.16 In 1697, when the heads of the mountain county of Guishun sent horses, the 
[Trinh] lord gave a lavish farewell banquet in honor of their envoy.17  
 Whereas the conflicts that arose over the three mountain settlements in Tuyên Quang 
emphasized the political maneuvers of the tribal chieftains to maintain their position vis-à-vis the 
state, the conflicts over the six mường (Ch. muang) in Hưng Hóa with which this article opened 
show that geography and a long history of interactions in a border area far from centers of power 
produced a complex political situation that fueled disputes between the two countries. Well 
before the issue of sovereignty over the six mường was raised by the Nguyễn, that area had 
already become a theater of contestation. In fact, the six mường constituted only a small part of a 
larger area that covered ten mountain counties in the An Tây Prefecture of Hưng Hóa 
Commandery (corresponding to the present triangle bordered by China, Vietnam, and Laos). 
 To explain why an area that belonged to Vietnam was transferred to Qing jurisdiction, 
nineteenth-century Vietnamese scholars claimed that in the early eighteenth century, seven of the 
ten mountain counties of the old An Tây Prefecture—Tung Lăng, Lễ Tuyền, Hoàng Nham, Tuy 
Phụ, Hợp Phì, Khiêm and Lai—had belonged in Hưng Hóa Commandery (see map 1). Because 
of governmental neglect, however, the people of these seven counties had fallen under the 
control of the northern (Qing) court, and Chinese border officials forced them to change their 
clothing and hairstyle and to register to pay taxes.18 In the mid-eighteenth century, Hoàng Công 
Chất, who had led a rebellion in the Red River Delta before fleeing to the jungle of Hưng Hóa, 
took over the area and remained in control for the next three decades. Hoàng Công Chất later 
submitted to the Lê-Trịnh and accepted an official title from the regime.19 Still later, taking 
advantage of the inaccessible location of the Mãnh Thiên Settlement, he forged an alliance with 
the heads of ten mountain counties; this turned him into one of the most powerful leaders in the 
border region in the decade of 1750–1760.20 In the first month of 1769, taking advantage of the 
death of Hoàng Công Chất, Lê-Trịnh forces defeated his son Hoàng Công Toản and took control 
over the territory that the Hoàng clan had previously ruled. Hoàng Công Toản and four hundred 
of his men fled to Yunnan and submitted to the Qing. In 1771, bowing to Vietnamese pressure, 
the Qianlong Emperor sent Hoàng Công Toản and his followers into exile in Xinjiang.21  
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 Hoàng Công Toản’s submission to the Qing was probably a factor in the incorporation of 
the six settlements (mường) into the Chinese territory. In 1792, after establishing relations with 
the Qing, the Tây Sơn regime (1789–1802) proposed to reclaim the lost lands, reasoning that 
“these settlements that adjoin Kaihua in Yunnan were previously ruled by Hoàng Công Toản and 
his clan. After he surrendered [to the Qing], local people requested to be considered as living 
within the Chinese space (nội phụ); accordingly, local officials levied taxes from them.”22 
Historians of the Nguyễn dynasty that succeeded the Tây Sơn had a different explanation: 
“When Hoàng Công Chất secretly occupied the area, tribal leaders, afraid of his malignant power, 
asked to be incorporated into the northern [Qing] space. Moreover, Qing subjects also often 
forced their way into these settlements, as a result of which Quảng Lăng and Khiêm Counties 
were annexed by Jianshui District in Kaihua Prefecture.”23 But in 1769, Đoàn Nguyễn Thục, a 
high official of the Lê-Trịnh, reported to the court after putting down the Hoàng Công Chất 
rebellion:  
 
In the ten mountain counties of Hưng Hoá, the population has declined in the 
aftermath of rebellion; most Nùng and Man people have left. Tribal heads 
neglected their administrative responsibilities; some went to Laos, others to 
China. [We need to] urgently discuss how to address this problem and restore 
laws so the people of these ten settlements will be returned in perpetuity to our tax 
rolls.24  
 
In order to enforce the role of the state in this region, the Lê-Trịnh regime promulgated a law of 
fourteen articles. Besides granting certain privileges to local communities and creating a system 
for collecting taxes and assuring security, this body of laws prohibited Tai people from assuming 
Qing clothing and paying taxes to the Chinese state.25 
 Written from different perspectives and at different times, these documents reflect the 
same reality: the unequal balance of power between the two centers had a direct impact on the 
political stances of the tribal chieftains at the periphery. Tax collection by Qing officials and 
northern cultural influences on the populations of the ten counties may have occurred over a long 
period of time. Despite a lack of concrete evidence, there is also a strong possibility that Hoàng 
Công Chất and his son, Hoàng Công Toản, had cultivated relations with the Qing before the Lê-
Trịnh pacification campaign. Moreover, the Hoàng of Mường Thanh and other local tribal 
chieftains may have accepted falling under both Chinese and Vietnamese jurisdictions as a 
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means of assuring recognition and protection by (and from) both sides. The political 
changeability of the region’s tribal chieftains persisted until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. But, together with the arrival of the state, this situation did not just lead to simple 
conflicts; it also created a whole series of misunderstandings between the two states.  
 Conflicts involving the Đèo clan in the Hưng Hóa Commandery and others that unfolded 
in Phong Thu, a garrison lying next to the Qing District of Jianshui, illustrate yet another aspect 
of the multiple orientations of the tribal chieftains in the conflicts and violent interactions on the 
border. They show that, at the local level, power was wielded by an unstable coalition of local 
chieftains with their own interests and political allegiances, a coalition that acted singly or as a 
group to maintain or break up existing power structures and intervened directly in negotiations 
involving central-local relations, as well as those between China and Vietnam in the borderland.  
 According to both Vietnamese and Chinese sources, the Đèo clan was one of the oldest 
and most influential clans of tribal chieftains in the northwest of Vietnam and in a number of 
counties and districts in southern Yunnan. In the fifteenth century, the power of the clan even 
posed a threat to the newly established Lê dynasty so that the dynastic founder had to personally 
lead an army to pacify the northwest.26 When the Nguyễn began to restore the system of tribal 
chieftains in the early nineteenth century, an influential member of the clan, Đèo Quốc Thuyên, 
was one of the few local leaders to receive an official bureaucratic title, beginning with that of 
provisional captain (tuyên úy) for Chiêu Tấn County to special defense commander (phòng ngự 
sứ) of Hưng Hóa Commandery, all high positions in the Vietnamese tribal administration in the 
early nineteenth century.27 At the same time, Đèo Quốc Thuyên agreed to act as head of the 
military camp and collect taxes in the two settlements of Phong Thu và Bình Lư in Chiêu Tấn 
County, which lay next to Mãnh Thích estate (trại). This area was originally part of Lai County 
in Hưng Hóa but was lost to the Qing a long time ago, as Qing subjects had surreptitiously 
occupied it and renamed it Mengsuo estate.28 Đèo tribal leaders continued to accept bureaucratic 
appointments from both states. During the infancy of Thuyên’s grandson, Đèo Doãn An, the 
Nguyễn court allowed Đèo Vĩnh Điển to temporarily administer the area around Chiêu Tấn 
County. This may be why, in 1831, Đèo Doãn An requested from the Qing to be appointed estate 
head and explained that Đèo Vĩnh Điển had usurped power. Then, together with Đèo Doãn Kiên, 
Đèo Doãn Võ, and three hundred Qing soldiers, he captured Điển and brought him to Jianshui.29  
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 What had been a conflict that was strictly internal to the Đèo clan provoked tensions 
between the Qing and the Nguyễn. Immediately after Đèo Doãn An asked to submit to the Qing, 
the prefect of Linan (Linyuan Commandery), in which Jianshui was located, sent six hundred 
men to take Phong Thu, on the ground that “Phong Thu has long been an old part of Mengsuo 
and [the Vietnamese] have no right to occupy it.”30 The Nguyễn court reacted forcefully: “Hưng 
Hoá Commandery is clearly contiguous with Qing land; how must we deal with such a 
provocation by Qing officials so as to preserve national prestige?” An army of one thousand 
men, along with ten elephants, was swiftly dispatched to defend Hưng Hoá. Upon their arrival, 
three hundred men with five elephants were ordered to occupy Chiêu Tấn, and a letter was sent 
to the Qing court. The letter stated: “Phong Thu is an old part of our territory. Since ancient 
times, it has been occupied according to a well-defined border. As for the place called Mengsuo, 
it may exist, but we have never heard of its location; therefore, please do not listen to Doãn An 
and cause conflicts.”31 
 The letter seems to have had little immediate impact; only a few days later, Qing armies 
were still advancing on Phong Thu. Unable to resist, the commander of the post, Chử Đình 
Thông, withdrew to Bình Lư settlement. Emperor Minh Mệnh reacted by sending another two 
hundred soldiers and two elephants to Chiêu Tấn. Meanwhile, Qing soldiers were falling prey to 
disease and dying in large numbers; the rest scattered. By the time the Nguyễn army reached 
Phong Thu, the Qing army had already withdrawn. Direct confrontation was thus avoided. The 
Qing court finally acknowledged receipt of Emperor Minh Mệnh’s missive and responded by 
suggesting that the Nguyễn wait ten days so that the two sides could resolve the issue 
peacefully.32 The contest over Phong Thu reached closure when Đèo Doãn An was captured by 
Nguyễn soldiers as he sought to return to Hưng Hoá. He was taken to the capital, where he was 
executed. The court selected a younger son of Đèo Quốc Thuyên, named Đèo Quốc Long, as 
administrator of the two settlements of Phong Thu and Bình Lư and of the post of Phong Thu.33  
 
Local Conflicts, or Confrontations between States? 
 The history of communities in southern China and northern Vietnam is a history not only 
of interaction between the state and local communities but also of alliances, divisions, and 
competition among local actors. Even after China and Vietnam established tributary relations 
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and began to define the border, territorial contests and violent episodes did not decline, as 
documented in Chinese and Vietnamese sources. 
 From the perspective of the state, conflicts between tribal chieftains were characteristic of 
mountain settlement society. In the fifteenth century, the Lê minister Đinh Liệt averred: 
“Fighting among themselves is one of the characteristics of the barbarians (man yi) living in 
remote places; we need only to protect our territory and avoid conflicts over the border.”34 This 
suggests that in Vietnam, but also in China, it was accepted that violent power struggles among 
tribal chieftains lay outside the state’s power to control and did not affect its interests. However, 
as the next section of this article suggests, power struggles and political maneuverings on the part 
of the tribal chieftains transformed many contradictions and conflicts between local actors into 
state-level conflicts that tributary relations helped prevent from escalating into war. In fact, the 
intervention of the two regimes in the resolution of these local conflicts caused the local 
chieftains to recognize the real power of the state’s administrative structure and led to treaties 
delimiting the border. 
 The three case studies presented below show the diversity of conflicts, as well as forms of 
state engagement in the borderland in different places and contexts. While competition over 
economic interests and contests over space—such as forestland, agricultural land, and mining 
areas, became more intense in the borderland—competition for leadership and chieftainship was 
undeniably the fundamental cause of local conflicts. The degree of state concern and the methods 
for resolving conflicts varied. Each state actively sought to resolve conflicts through negotiation, 
but treaties between the two states could not bring peace to the border area. Conflicts persisted 
and came to an end only when a compromise was reached among local chieftains from both sides 
of the border. 
 
Dispute over Na Oa (Nawo) Village 
 The first of the three case studies involves the status of Na Oa (Nawo) Village (map 5), 
an important political and economic site along the border between Vietnam and China. Na Oa—
now in Ningming County (Guangxi) but then part of Lộc Bình, a mountain county in Lạng 
Sơn—commanded the fertile land next to the Chinese settlement of Siling County.35 The story 
starts with the memorial sent in 1689 by Đoàn Tuấn Khoa, a high official of the Lê, to the Qing 
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court regarding the boundary of Lộc Bình County in Trường Khánh Prefecture, Lạng Sơn 
Commandery.  
 
 
Map 5. Border dispute over Na Oa (Nawo) Hamlet. 1. Siling County 思陵州; 2. Lộc Bình 
County 祿平州; 3. Na Oa (Nawo)  Hamlet 那窩村. Source: Huang Jiamo (1986, 104). 
 
 According to Vietnamese sources, Na Oa was administered by Vi Đức Thắng, a tribal 
chieftain from a clan that had long ruled the area. When trouble erupted in the border area, Vi 
Đức Thắng seized the opportunity to annex seven settlements in Siling County and gathered 
local people to establish new areas of habitation. The tribal chieftain of Siling, Wei Rongyao, 
protested to Wu Xingzuo, the governor of Guangxi. Because Wei coveted the fertile land around 
Na Oa, he added it to the area that he was claiming back from Vi Đức Thắng. Negotiations over 
this issue dragged on for several decades until the Lê court appointed Đoàn Tuấn Khoa to seek a 
resolution. The Complete History of Đại Việt goes on to explain that Đoàn Tuấn Khoa took back 
not only Na Oa but also the seven other villages that Vi Đức Thắng had seized.  
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 In spite of this, the agreement reached by the two courts did not resolve internal conflicts. 
In 1701, Wei Rongyao, dissatisfied with the resolution of the dispute that had been reached, 
invaded fields belonging to the Lộc Bình County, forcing the Lê court to appoint the tribal 
chieftain Vi Phúc Vĩnh to take defensive measures. In 1724, the governor of Guangxi, Li Fu, sent 
a memorial to the Yongzheng Emperor reporting that “Vietnamese officials from Na Dương 
County are bringing local troops from Lộc Bình by the hundreds to the border with the intention 
of competing with Siling over Na Oa village; I have ordered local officials to surround them and 
to discreetly increase defensive measures.”36 In the end, Na Oa was absorbed into the Chinese 
territory.  
 
Dispute in Duzhou River Area 
 One of the most important instances of local politics leading to conflict between the states 
involved the Tụ Long (Dulong) copper mine. The story begins in 1725 with a report to the 
Yongzheng Emperor from Feng Yunzhong, the head of Kaihua Commandery, that a large army 
consisting of a thousand men led by the Vietnamese general Trịnh Kính had stationed itself right 
by the border of Yunnan.37 This created great concern in the whole border area. However, the 
presence of the Lê army did not reflect expansionist ambitions on the part of Đại Việt; rather, it 
was intended to protect its territory. A report by the governor-general of Yunnan-Guizhou, Gao 
Qizhuo, to Beijing in February 1726 elaborated on the nature of the trouble and the area 
involved: “The Kaihua border area includes land that used to be part of the [Chinese] empire but 
was lost to Jiaozhi (Giao Chỉ). Since then, copper had been mined there. The provincial 
administration commissioner Li Wei has previously reported on this matter. I believe that the 
issue of mining is of minor significance; but frontiers are important, so I conducted an 
investigation.”38  
 According to Gao, an area that included six estates in Fengchun contributing twelve shi39 
of grain annually to the Chinese side had come under Vietnamese control in 1686. After 
weighing a number of alternative interpretations of their actual location and of a border with 
Vietnam, he concluded that “the area covering eighty miles from Yanchang mountain to the 
south may have been lost to Vietnam some time during the Ming; if so, then we must reclaim it.” 
40 Yongzheng responded to the memorial by stressing the importance of harmonious relations 
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with foreign states. Furthermore, Annam was a compliant tributary state; the heavenly court 
should not fight with smaller states over matters of minor interest.41 So he proposed that the 
border be set at the Small Duzhou River (see map 6). The Lê court accepted this proposal, 
although it held on to the belief that “this area was forcibly seized by tribal officials of Kaihua; 
we have protested to the Qing court many times but Chinese officials took the side of the local 
tribal officials and argued that we were the ones who had invaded it.”42 Between 1726 and 1728 
the two courts sent officials to resolve disputes at the border without effect. 
 
 
 
Map 6. Border dispute in the Duzhou River area. 1. Mabo Border Pass 馬伯汛; 2. Dongan 
County 東安里; 3. Small Duzhou River 小賭咒河; 4. Big Duzhou River 大賭咒河. Source: Tan 
Qixiang (1982, 48–49). 
 
 The area in dispute—between the Small and Big Duzhou Rivers in the region of today’s 
Dulong and Jinkuang Counties in Maguan District, Yunnan Province—had been part of 
Vietnamese territory since the Ming and was heavily populated. So, when E Ertai, who replaced 
Gao Qizhuo as governor of Yunnan-Guizhou and represented the Qing court on border issues, 
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sent several missions to state the position of the Qing court on the matter, his envoys met with 
opposition from Hoàng Văn Phác, a local tribal chieftain.43 The strong reaction of the chieftains 
not only delayed the settling of the border but also increased tensions between the two courts. 
According to Vietnamese historians, “E Ertai suspected our side of having some nefarious plan 
so he asked the Qing court to mobilize troops in various provinces and privately requested that 
Guangdong and Guangxi prepare troops and banners to relieve the disputed border.” 44 
Eventually, in 1729, the issue was resolved, with the border set south of the Small Duzhou River. 
Two Lê officials, Nguyễn Huy Nhuận and Nguyễn Công Thái, went to Tuyên Quang to draw the 
borderline and plant boundary markers together with Qing officials. According to Lê historians, 
“the Kaihua tribal chieftains wanted to hinder the transfer of rolls in Baoshan, so they lied about 
the exact location of Duzhou River. Nguyễn Công Thái, knowing they lied, traveled to remote 
and dangerous places, passing through silver and copper mines, and determined the real location 
of Duzhou River. He then erected a stele at the border.”45 
 As the story of the border at the Duzhou River area shows, local tribal chieftains were 
sometimes the driving force behind orders from the central government. In fact, all of the two 
courts’ opinions related to territorial sovereignty in this area closely aligned with those of local 
tribal chieftains. On the Vietnamese side, it was Hoàng Văn Phác’s opinion; on the Qing side, 
Gao Qizhuo reflected the opinions of the native officials of Kaihua. This is easily explained by 
the fact that the Tụ Long (Dulong) mine not only was coveted by tribal chieftains but also was an 
arena for competition between various political forces. 
  
Dispute over the Bamboo Fence in Pingxiang and Siling Mountain Counties  
 Competition did not only involve sites of economic significance. It had also become a 
way of life, as illustrated by the following disputes over a bamboo fence that shine light on 
everyday life on the border and the role of the state in local affairs (see map 7). In 1750, officials 
in Guangxi sent a memorial to the effect that many different types of bamboo grew in the area; 
the plants had strong trunks, but local people could not make use of them because they were 
covered with thorns. For this reason, the officials suggested that they should be planted in the 
border area, since, after a few years, the resulting forest could serve as an important component 
of border defense by deterring trespassers. The following spring, the Qianlong Emperor agreed 
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to the proposal and put the new province chief of Guangxi, Ding Chang, in charge of 
implementing it. Ding Chang immediately ordered the opening of a bamboo plantation along the 
boundaries of the area under his direct jurisdiction, but six months later, the governor-general of 
Liangguang reported to the Qing court that “[Vietnamese] people are pulling up the bamboo 
fence along the border and invading Chinese land.”46 The court debated this serious issue. 
Qianlong argued that, as a general principle, the Middle Kingdom should not betray weakness 
toward foreign barbarian states, but, for that very reason, it should not oppress them either; the 
goal was to maintain trouble-free (xiangan wushi) conditions along the border. The court ordered 
an increase in defensive forces and sent an investigating team to Pingxiang. The team reported 
back the reality on the ground that 
 
Pingxiang County is adjacent to Vietnam with mountains serving as borders; the 
terrain is uneven and the population is mixed. When they planted bamboo, 
Pingxiang residents trespassed into Vietnamese land, except where the difficult 
terrain prevented them from planting. Elsewhere, bamboo trees were planted 
every forty meters. Any tree that grew on Vietnamese land was cut down; all 
those planted correctly along the border were left alone.47 
 
 
 
Map  7. Border at Pingxiang, Guangxi Province, in the Qing dynasty. 1. Na He Pass 那河隘;      
2. Bằng Tường Mountain County 憑祥州; 3. Tư Lăng Mountain County 思陵州. Source: Tan 
(1982, 46–47). 
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The Qing court concluded that the incident arose from the fact that the populations were 
intermixed, so, “if local people are severely punished for breaking laws, then foreign ones cannot 
escape similar punishment.”48 It urged tribal officials to continue planting bamboo, with the 
stipulation that any mistakes must be made good. They were not to trespass onto Vietnamese 
territory, but they must not yield ground and withdraw. People who lived in mixed communities 
must be punished and their tribal officials reprimanded. The populations must be re-separated. 
The court also asked Vietnam to send back those guilty of trespassing so that they could be dealt 
with.49 
Barely a month later, before tensions in Pingxiang had abated, the head of Siling County, 
Wei Riyi, and tribal elder Li Yanggao allegedly received a report from Luo Fuli of the Nahe 
Settlement to the effect that, in the seventh month, more than twenty people from Bản Bổng 
Settlement in Lộc Bình County had crossed into Chinese territory and moved the earthen wall 
east of Mi-ke mountain as well as the bamboo border. They had penetrated two hundred meters 
into China and taken sixty-two ricefields. The governor-general of Liangguang, Suchang, saw 
that the incident in Siling bore resemblance to that of Pingxiang and ordered an on-site 
investigation; he also sent troops close to Nahe and forbade border crossing. The investigating 
team discovered that the wall seemed newly built, as the earth was still red. Upon being 
interrogated, Wei Riyi and Luo Fuli admitted that they had conceived the scheme of seizing land 
after receiving the order to plant bamboo. They had conspired with Huang Qingfang, promising 
him that each year he would receive four baskets of grain. The two then urged their people to 
build a wall and plant bamboo; this had brought fifty-eight Vietnamese ricefields into Chinese 
territory. Contradicting earlier reports that Vietnamese had trespassed into China, the 
investigation led to a whole raft of local officials being punished. Luo Fuli, Huang Qingfang, and 
their men were sent into the army at Pingle Prefecture; Wei Riyi and Li Yanggao were cashiered; 
Zhang Shangzhong, a Pingxiang elder in charge of tree planting, was also cashiered for his 
responsibility for the border violation.50 
Although the border conflicts of 1750–1751 ended with the dishonorable dismissal of 
many officials, this did not spell the end of such conflicts. In the early eighteenth century, a Qing 
official observed that 
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the three prefectures of Nanning, Taiping, and Siming border Jiaozhi [Vietnam] 
over thousands of miles without a dividing wall or even mountains to define 
territorial limits; ricefields lie next to each other, and the inhabitants of villages 
[on either side of the border] can see one another. But the local barbarians have 
many customs among which are raiding and pillaging one another. Sometimes, 
our people cross over to pillage; sometimes, it’s the [foreign] barbarians who 
invade.51  
 
His observation could be applied to the whole eighteenth century. 
 
State Intervention and Its Limits 
 Constant references to local disturbances and frequent assertions of sovereignty in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries suggest the two states’ increased attention to the 
border. But state intervention did not result in a definitive resolution of conflicts. Over several 
centuries, the tusi/thổ ty system had been deployed by both regimes to bring order to the border 
area. In reality, it brought about the opposite result: divisions and contradictions within local 
communities.  
 By implementing the system of circulating officials (gaitu guiliu), the Qing court may 
have hoped to bring the administration of the border area under greater control from the center 
and decrease the incidence of border conflicts. It began to implement the policy of appointing 
circulating officials in the south, in particular in Guangxi and Yunnan, under Kangxi (1654–
1722) and especially Yongzheng (1722–1735). In Vietnam, the same policy began to be 
implemented in 1831–1832 during the reign of Minh Mệnh (1820–1840) (Nguyễn 1996; Vũ 
2014). To this was added a campaign of Confucian education, with the state sending education 
officials to “civilize” border peoples and transform them into proper imperial subjects. Finally, 
self-governing communities such as mountain settlements or estates became official 
administrative units such as hamlets and villages. At the same time, individuals and families 
were registered on population censuses and tax rolls and their lands on property rolls (Herman 
1997). The efforts of both courts to expand their presence in the border area brought significant 
results. First, the administrative apparatus of each state was more extensive and powerful than 
before. After the administrative reforms in China, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
court-appointed officials were in charge of most of the administrative units in Guangxi (Huang 
Jiaxin 2007, 163–164). In Vietnam (racked by civil war for the last three decades of the 
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eighteenth century and only under a unified regime since 1802), the number of communities 
labeled as “mountain settlements” declined considerably in comparison with the early eighteenth 
century; they had become communes (xã), basic units under the direct control of the state. The 
system of administrative documents such as land and population registers helped in population 
management and the collection of taxes (Ngô and Papin, 2003; Dương and Phạm, 2012). The 
two states gained increased knowledge of the geography, customs, and populations of the area. 
The production of gazetteers in both China and Vietnam testified to the appointment of officials 
to the region as well as the expansion of education among local communities 
 These developments did not, however, completely destroy the power of local actors. In 
Guangxi, some tribal chieftains retained their power until the twentieth century. In 1907, the tusi 
of Pingxiang, Liu Zhupei, tried to foment a rebellion and fled to Vietnam. He was cashiered and 
the post of tusi was finally abolished.52 The previous year, Li Depu in Anping was punished for 
an infraction, leading to the end of the tusi system that had endured over five hundred years in 
that area through twenty-five generations of tribal chieftains (Took 2005, 88). In Vietnam, the 
introduction of the system of circulating officials met with fierce resistance on the part of tribal 
chieftains, reaching a high point in the Nông Văn Vân rebellion of 1833–1835. Although the 
rebellion was put down, the Nguyễn court was forced to abandon the new policy and return to 
the old thổ ty system (Vũ 2014, 372–373).  
 Efforts to extend education into mountain areas similarly met with little success. The 
Vietnamese court complained on numerous occasions about the poor quality of the teachers and 
network of schools in the border area. Several centuries of civil war and disorder could not 
produce a strong administrative infrastructure or the necessary foundation for “civilizing” local 
inhabitants. In addition, the educational efforts of the Nguyễn took place in a very short time, in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century. Since the 1830s, the mountain area of the China-
Vietnam borderland was continously overwhelmed by military forces and bandits associated 
with the Nông Văn Vân uprising. Of the seven hundred men who received the cử nhân degree in 
regional exams from 1813 to 1879, only one came from Hưng Hóa; none came from Tuyên 
Quang, Cao Bằng, Lạng Sơn, or Quảng Yên (Đỗ 2013). 
 Besides the enduring power of the tribal chieftains, the ability of the Chinese and 
Vietnamese courts to intervene in border conflicts was further limited by the difficult terrain, 
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power imbalance between the two countries, and lack of clarity in the management of border 
populations. Imperfect identification of the border populations complicated state administrative 
efforts. Chinese applied the terms yi (barbarian) and tu (native) to inhabitants of the border to 
distinguish them from Han; Vietnamese used the term Thổ (tu) in the same way; but Vietnamese 
elites of the Nguyễn era, besides calling themselves Kinh, also identified themselves as Han—
that is, as representatives of Han civilization in contradistinction to non-Sinicized/non-Viet 
communities. The lack of clear identification of such communities caused migratory networks 
and kinship and exchange relations to blur the borderline and helped their members move outside 
the reach of the state. Cross-border movement by tribal chieftains was extremely widespread 
before the twentieth century. In confrontations with the center, many tribal chieftains fled across 
the border, as had Hoàng Văn Đồng in the eighteenth century and Nông Văn Vân in the 
nineteenth. 
 Beginning in 1860, the border area became a theater of warfare between different 
political and military actors, from remnants of the Taiping to the Black Flags, Yellow Flags, and 
local bandits (Davis 2008). This significantly curbed the ability of the state to administer the 
region and turned it into an arena of violent competition for power for two decades before 
colonialism restored order. 
 
Making and Unmaking the China-Vietnam Border in the Early Modern Era 
 In his seminal work on the role of maps in constructing the geo-body of Siam, Thongchai 
Winichakul suggested that national borders did not emerge there in the early modern era because 
there was no network of borders in the political regimes in the region; people then conceived of 
the world as made up of large and powerful polities and smaller, weaker centers (Thongchai 
1994, 81–88). Although the world order that Thongchai depicts bears some resemblance to the 
tributary relationship between China and Vietnam over a millennium, this article has sought to 
demonstrate that the potential for dividing up space had its origins in the combination of 
competition for power among local actors and the expansionist policies of the two states. A 
question arises out of this new understanding: did this partitioning of space have the same 
meaning for the state and for local people as our present definition of national borders? 
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 Presumably, the conception of power and the management of space by the two countries 
differed significantly from our present understandings. Terms that were frequently used in 
premodern Vietnam and China included “belonging to” and “maps,” and maps included both 
terrain and populations, with the second being of greater importance (Wen 2008, 310); the two 
states were more concerned with people and their locations than with empty geographical space. 
Part of the reason may have been the tributary relationship in force until 1885. From the Chinese 
perspective, according to which Vietnam was conceived of as belonging to the Chinese world 
order, the governing distinction was between “Han” and “barbarian” (yi) rather than between two 
separate countries. Although the Nguyễn dynasty often boasted of its cultural orthodoxy in 
contrast to the foreign origins of the Qing, its elite never rejected the tributary relationship.  
 
 
 
Map 8. Vietnam in the late nineteenth century.  1. Yunnan Province 雲南; 2. Lào Cai Town  老
街; 3. The border of the Great Qing 大清國界; 3. Cao Bằng Province  高平; 4. Guangxi 
Province 廣西; 5. Long County  龍州; 6. Taiping Prefecture  太平. Source: Anonymous (18??). 
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 While all conflicts had local origins, local people did not always accept the resolution of 
their disputes by the two centers, which resulted in the latter’s efforts to highlight differences and 
divide territorial space. Local people found greater commonality of language and patterns of 
exchange with similar communities across the border than with populations under the same 
political regime, which undermined the efficacy of the border at ensuring territorial sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, the two centers’ efforts at defining the boundaries of their respective territory did 
have some impact.  
 In 1870, after learning of a French invasion of Vietnam, the Qing court sent Xu Yanxu, 
an official with long experience in Guangxi, to Vietnam. After eight months there, Xu wrote a 
book in which he gave a brief survey of the history, culture, and customs of Vietnam, 
systematically describing the border area with a list of hundreds of passes and military posts 
stretching from the coast of Guangdong to mountainous prefectures of Yunnan (Xu 1877, 169–
210). Although the survey’s primary goal was military, it can be seen as the first step on the part 
of Chinese officials toward seeing Vietnam not as a part of the Sinosphere but as a territorially 
sovereign state (see map 8). 
 
 
Map 9. The Sino-Vietnamese borderland, 1889–1890. Source: Commission Française 
d’Abornement (1889–1890). 
 
 Not long afterward, Xu’s geography was used to define the border between China and 
Vietnam. The treaty between China and France in 1887 thus capped a centuries-long process of 
boundary formation (see map 9). It was the result not only of French colonial might and the 
introduction of Western cartographic techniques but of centuries of interaction between China 
and Vietnam and the peoples living in the border area. Did the drawing of a borderline create a 
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well-defined geo-body on either side of it? The borderline cut through communities that shared 
the same ethnicity and continued to maintain relations of kinship and economic exchange across 
it. During periods of conflict between the two countries, these communities were forced to take 
sides, and yet they continued to be viewed with suspicion by their respective governments. The 
drawing and redrawing of the China-Vietnam border between 1887 and 2009 did not alter this 
situation. Neither cartography nor nationalist histories can capture the complexity of life for in-
between communities or their relationships to states that are at once far away and yet all too 
dominant. To view these communities as mere victims of rapacious state expansionism is to deny 
them historical agency and, in particular, to ignore their role in bringing the state to the margins 
of its territory through the attempts of their leaders to compete for power and preserve their 
freedom of action. 
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Notes 
 
1 Đại Nam thực lục (hereafter, ĐNTL) (2004, 2:666–668).  
2 Đại Việt sử ký tục biên (hereafter, TB) (1991, 48).  
3 After the Lê dynasty was restored to the throne in 1592, real power was held by the Trịnh 
until 1786 (hence the often hyphenated name of the regime). The regime controlled only 
the northern half of today’s Vietnam. 
4 See “China, Vietnam Settle Land Border Issue,” Xinhua, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/23/content_10878785.htm, accessed May 6, 
2016. 
5 For example, the development of new cartographic techniques in Europe in the late 
sixteenth century made it possible for France to be represented as a nation with complete 
sovereignty over its territorial space. In reality, at different times since the sixteenth 
century, French space was divided up by power struggles. France as we know it only 
came into being after World War I, when Alsace-Lorraine, lost to Germany in 1871, was 
restored to the French territory by the Treaty of Versailles. Even the current familiar 
image of France dates only from the early nineteenth century, thanks to the creation of a 
nationwide administrative structure during the Revolution and its increased centralization 
under Napoleon (Branch 2014, 150–162). 
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6 Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư (hereafter, TT) (1993, 1:219). 
7 In the Treaty of 1084, the two sides identified eight passes as forming the limits of Song 
territory: Gengjian/Canh Liệm; Khâu Cự/Qiuju; Khiếu Nhạc/Jiaoyue; Thông 
Khoáng/Tongkuang; Gengyan/Canh Nham; Dunli/Đốn Lỵ; Duoren/Đa Nhân; and 
Gounan/Câu Nam. The entire area lying outside these passes—territory that included the 
six prefectures of Bao/Bảo; Le/Lạc; Lian/Luyện; Miao/Miêu; Ding/Đình; and 
Fang/Phóng and the two mountain settlements of Su/Túc and Sang/Tang—were given 
over to Jiaozhi/Giao Chỉ (Vietnamese) administrative management. See Li Tao (1985, 
Q.279:6831). 
8 TT (1993, 1:280).  
9 Thiên Nam dư hạ tập (hereafter, TNDH) (14??, 10:56). 
10 Ming shilu (hereafter, MSL) (1962, vol 9: Shizong shilu, 4262) 
11 Qing shilu (hereafter, QSL)  (1988, 3:988). 
12 TB (1991, 31).  
13 TB (1991, 33). 
14 TB (1991, 48). 
15 QSL (1988, 5: 984–985). 
16 TB (1991, 27). 
17 TB (1991, 32). 
18 Khâm Định Việt sử thông giám cương mục (hereafter, CM) (1998, 2:982). 
19  CM (1998, 2:862).  
20 Hưng Hóa xứ phong thổ lục (hereafter, HH) (1778, 14).  
21 QSL (1988, 19:793) 
22 Zhongguo Gudai Zhongyue Guanxi Shiliao Xuanbian  (hereafter, SLHB) (1985, 556–
557). 
23 CM (1998, 2:952).  
24 TB (1991, 327). 
25 TB (1991, 327–328). 
26 TT (1993, 2:370). 
27 Thanks to Bradley C. Davis for translating these titles. 
28 ĐNTL (2004, 3:60). 
29 ĐNTL (2004, 3:61).  
30 ĐNTL (2004, 3:62). 
31 ĐNTL (2004, 3:188–189). 
32 ĐNTL (2004, 3:190). 
33 ĐNTL (2004, 3:215). 
34 TT (1993, 2:448). 
35 TB (1991, 34). 
36 Gongzhongdang Yongzheng Zouzhe (hereafter, GZD) (1977, 3:368). 
37 QSL (1988, 7:479–480); GZD (1977, 3:651–652).  
38 GZD (1977, 3:771–772). 
39 1 shi = 100 liters  
40 QSL (1988, 7:479). 
41 QSL (1988, 7:480). 
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42 TB (1991, 108). 
43 CM (1998, 2:808); TB (1991, 108). 
44 CM (1998, 2:809); TB (1991, 108). 
45 CM (1998, 2:810). 
46 Qingdai Dangan Shiliao Xuanbian (hereafter, QDA) (2010, 2:611–612). 
47 QDA (2010, 2:615). 
48 QDA (2010, 2:615). 
49 QDA (2010, 2:617). 
50 QDA (2010, 2:620–621). 
51 GZD (1977, 3:368). 
52  QSL (1988, 60:543). 
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